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‘‘The Council has been your
Creation’’ : Hamilton Fish
Armstrong, Paradigm of the
American Foreign Policy
Establishment?
PRISCILLA ROBERTS
He was born in 1893 in the New York brownstone house near
Washington Square where he lived all his adult life, a member of Edith
Wharton’s settled, circumscribed world of ordered privilege whose
aﬄuent, well-travelled, and sophisticated men and women traced their
lineage back to the Founding Fathers and their principles to the American
Revolution. His father was an artist who served as Consul General to
Italy, and Armstrong was brought up in a milieu which took for granted
the fact that there existed a world outside the United States." He died in
1973, as the United States finally withdrew from the Vietnam War, a
conflict which deeply distressed him and shattered the foreign policy elite
and its controlling consensus, whose creation had been a major part of his
life ’s work. In an obituary notice Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., described
him as ‘‘a New York gentleman of a vanishing school, ’’ who ‘‘treated
every one, old or young, famous or unknown, with the same generous
courtesy and concern. ’’#
The career of Hamilton Fish Armstrong, a founder and mainstay of the
Council on Foreign Relations and of its influential journal Foreign Affairs,
which he edited for fifty years, for all but six serving as its most senior
editor, spanned the development, apogee, and disintegration of the
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" Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Those Days (New York: Harper & Row, 1963).
# Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., obituary notice, Foreign Affairs, 51 (1973).
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United States foreign policy Establishment. Armstrong’s career as editor
and Council official is enlightening as to the manner in which the
supposedly private and nongovernmental Council was instrumental in
developing the foreign policy of the United States between the wars and
even more during and after the Second World War. Rarely in the public
eye, during his long life Armstrong nonetheless unobtrusively participated
in an impressive number of key moments in the formulation of official
United States foreign policy. For decades he habitually travelled abroad
for several months of the year, meeting the political and intellectual elite
of numerous countries and keeping detailed diary-notes of his experiences,
as he usually did of those many other significant occasions when he was
at least an interested bystander and often much more. A Democrat who
worked easily with numerous Republicans, he had the knack of being
present when key decisions were under consideration. His career in many
ways epitomized the style and outlook of the elite which to a large degree
took such decisions.$
Armstrong’s real introduction to American politics came in 1912 as a
freshman at Princeton, when the University’s former president, Woodrow
Wilson, ran a successful campaign as the Democratic candidate for
President of the United States. Although still too young to vote,
Armstrong supported Wilson, whose inspiration would to a considerable
degree inform the remainder of his career, and marched exuberantly in the
President-elect’s victory parade. Even at this time Armstrong displayed a
precocious interest in international affairs. In spring 1913 he planned to
help organize a ‘‘conference of college men at Washington … to promote
World peace. ’’% At Princeton he arranged meetings featuring a variety of
speakers of all nationalities. As a youthful undergraduate editor of the
Daily Princetonian, in February 1916 Armstrong publicly though un-
successfully opposed the pro-Allied Princeton president John Grier
Hibben’s proposal to introduce military training as a credit-bearing course
for undergraduates, and his letter on the subject was reprinted in the New
York Evening Post and discussed in other leading publications.& While
$ Armstrong’s autobiography of his public years, Peace and Counter-Peace from Wilson to
Hitler : Memoirs of Hamilton Fish Armstrong (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), only
covers the period to 1933. Shortly before his death in 1973 he began a second volume,
never completed, whose three draft chapters deal with the mid-1930s. Hamilton Fish
Armstrong Papers, Mudd Manuscripts Library, Princeton University, box 120, file
Manuscript : Unpublished continuation of Peace and Counterpeace, 1972.
% Edwin P. Mead to Armstrong, 18 Mar. 1913, ibid., box 43, file Edwin P. Mead.
& Armstrong, diary, 29 Feb., 1, 3, 6, 10, 30 Mar., 5, 22 May 1916, ibid., box 128 ;
Armstrong, Peace and Counter-Peace, 26–27.
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opposing selective military training, an attitude he later described in his
memoirs as ‘‘naive at the time and … more so in light of later events, ’’ in
mid-June 1916 Armstrong also published a letter in the New York Times
favouring universal military conscription as a means of preventing the
disproportionate sacrifice of ‘‘the better sort … representatives of leading
families with traditions, of service of university graduates and under-
graduates and other educated men, ’’ while the ‘‘great lower middle
class … refused to be stirred’’ and the ‘‘laboring class ’’ took advantage of
the opportunity of war ‘‘to make demand after demand. ’’’ Moreover, he
already supported proposals that after the war the United States should
assume a much more active world role. In May 1916 he served as the
Princeton delegate at a meeting of the League to Enforce Peace, where
Woodrow Wilson endorsed the creation of a post-war international
organization to maintain peace.(
After American intervention Armstrong, like most of his classmates,
made strenuous efforts to join the army, and was quickly accepted into an
officers ’ training camp. A lifelong special interest in the Balkans, begun
at Princeton when he helped the good-looking, American-born Madame
Slavko Grouich raise funds for the Serbian Red Cross, was cemented in
late 1917, when he was seconded as an aide to the Serbian War Mission’s
General Rashich. Armstrong spent much of the next eighteen months in
Belgrade and travelled all over the Balkans, developing a particularly close
friendship with the future King Alexander of Yugoslavia, which lasted
until the latter’s assassination in October 1934. Over time Armstrong
would write numerous articles and several books on Southeastern
Europe, visiting the area frequently and winning many good friends
there, to some of whom he remained close until his death.)
Armstrong’s Balkan interests, however close to his heart, were only one
aspect of a broader passion for international affairs which in summer 1919
led him to apply for a position on the League of Nations secretariat.
Raymond B. Fosdick, the American nominee for Under Secretary to the
League, accepted him as an assistant, but early in 1920 Fosdick himself
resigned his position, fearing that to continue in it might adversely affect
’ Armstrong, diary, 22 June 1916, Armstrong papers, box 128 ; clipping, New York
Times, 21 June 1916, ibid., box 105.
( Armstrong, diary, 28, 29 May 1916, Armstrong papers, box 128.
) Armstrong’s books on the area included The New Balkans (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1926) ; Where the East Begins (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1929) ; and
Tito and Goliath (New York: Macmillan, 1971). He also wrote numerous articles on the
Balkans, most of which were published in Foreign Affairs.
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the continuing League fight in the United States Senate.* Armstrong, who
had since his Princeton days been attracted to the world of journalism,
joined the staff of the New York Evening Post, a newspaper which had just
been bought by the pro-League of Nations Thomas W. Lamont, a partner
in the famous banking firm of J. P. Morgan & Company and an economic
adviser to Woodrow Wilson at the Paris Peace Conference. The new
proprietor, a former journalist who liquidated his enticing but expensive
investment a few years later, was at this time ‘‘determined to restore it as
a voice of liberal conservatism. ’’"! The paper took a firmly pro-League
stance, and the apprentice Armstrong found himself reporting on a wide
variety of topics, both foreign and domestic. Perhaps even more
important, his position gave him the opportunity to meet numerous
prominent international figures, such as Lord Bryce, the former British
Ambassador to the United States, and the South African leader General
Jan Christian Smuts.""
In March 1922 Armstrong, then visiting Europe for his wife’s health,
was offered the position of assistant or managing editor of the quarterly
journal, Foreign Affairs, which the newly created Council on Foreign
Relations wished to establish. In the most crucial decision of his career, he
accepted the job and proceeded to spend the next several months
travelling around Europe, observing the political scene and persuading
prominent European figures to contribute to the new periodical. Initially
the managing editor of Foreign Affairs, Armstrong soon assumed increased
responsibility for it as the health of Archibald Cary Coolidge, the Harvard
professor of history who had been one of the American experts at Paris
and who served as chief editor, deteriorated during the 1920s."# When
Coolidge died in 1928 Armstrong took over his position, having already
acquired additional and much-needed help with his more general duties
on the Council when Walter T. Mallory took over from him as executive
director in 1927. Even before Mallory took this position, Armstrong had
initiated an extensive programme of dinner talks, discussion meetings,
and study groups, and he continued to be heavily involved in setting the
Council’s agenda. Many years later Mallory, on his retirement, would tell
* Armstrong, Peace and Counter-Peace, 99–100. "! Ibid., 110.
"" See ibid., chapters 8 and 9.
"# See the extensive correspondence between Coolidge and Armstrong in the Armstrong
Papers ; also Robert F. Byrnes, Awakening American Education to the World : The Role of
Archibald Cary Coolidge, – (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press,
1982), 180–202.
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Armstrong quite simply: ‘ [T]he Council has been your creation. ’’"$ In
Foreign Affairs, his influence was paramount. ‘‘The chief function of the
[Foreign Affairs advisory] board in my experience, ’’ one member said
upon his retirement, ‘‘has been to admire Ham.’’ Another added that
‘‘none of us was under the illusion that we were anything but a group of
people Ham likes to talk to. ’’"%
In 1922 the Council on Foreign Relations was still a fledgling
organization, not the imposing and prestigious body it would later
become. Much of its later success would indeed be the fruit of the effort
that the young and enthusiastic Armstrong devoted not only to its
publications but to building up the parent institution, an endeavour which
was to be his life’s work. When accepting the position of editor,
Armstrong recalled, ‘‘I did not know that I also would take over running
the Council on Foreign Relations, which meant seeing to its financing,
membership and meetings. ’’"& In early 1922 the Council was in serious
difficulties. It represented two separate organizations which had merged
in 1920. One, the original Council on Foreign Relations, ‘‘a group
organized in 1918 by leading lawyers, bankers and other men of affairs in
New York to discuss wartime problems and entertain foreign visitors ’’,
was by mid-1920 ‘‘languishing’’ and ‘‘old and waning. ’’ The second, more
academic in its emphasis, was the American Institute of International
Affairs, one of two ‘‘separate but associated’’ organizations, the other
being the British Royal Institute of International Affairs, founded by the
respective American and British experts who came together at the Paris
Peace Conference. The two American organizations amalgamated in early
1921, appointing a prominent and well-connected board of directors,
carefully setting fees that academics as well as businessmen could afford,
and launching a successful fundraising drive targeted at those in the New
York financial community – Lamont, for instance, and the German-
Jewish banker Otto H. Kahn – who had shown strong support for an
enhanced United States international role."’
"$ Mallory to Armstrong, 11 June 1959, Armstrong papers, box 42, file Walter H.
Mallory.
"% Clipping from Newsweek, 2 Oct. 1972, in ibid., box 52, file Retirement.
"& Armstrong, Peace and Counter-Peace, 162.
"’ Ibid., 4–6, 181–85 ; Robert D. Schulzinger, The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs : The History
of the Council on Foreign Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 3–10 ;
Michael Wala, The Council on Foreign Relations and American Policy in the Early Cold War
(Providence : Berghahn Books, 1994), 1–9 ; Peter Grose, Continuing the Inquiry : The
Council on Foreign Relations from  to  (New York: Council on Foreign Relations,
1996), 1–9.
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Ironically, in 1920 Armstrong opposed the merger of the two
organizations, writing to his friend Whitney Shepardson:
You ask my views on the proposal to discontinue the Institute, in view of the fact
that the Council on Foreign Relations is planning to enlarge its membership and
expand its activities. It does not appear to me that this fact has any bearing on
the policy of the Institute. The Council on Foreign Relations will merely become
more unwieldy, more conservative, more generally useless, if it takes in a large
number of new members on top of its present assortment. My understanding of
the Institute was that it planned to secure a small membership among men
interested in day by day developments of international affairs, and acquainted to
some measure with conditions existing in certain foreign countries. I thought that
such a group, consisting of younger men and older and more experienced men
alike, had a very useful function to perform, and that one of its advantages would
be that, being a small group, it could not embark on the usual round of
publishing useless bulletins and calling dull dinners to listen to the stereotyped
speeches of professional publicists. I do not say that this is what the Council on
Foreign Relations is going to do. I only say that I don’t see how it can fail to do
that, given its present organization and membership. The fact that it is on a
‘‘sound financial basis ’’ seems to me like a distinct disadvantage. Most of the
members of it are on a far too ‘‘sound financial basis ’’ to care much about any
facts in conflict with their usual outlook. This sounds like an unbalanced
statement. I know many of the members of the Council, respect them heartily,
and consider that it is a great honor to meet them and talk to them. But I think
they represent one set of ideas, the ideas of New York business men, very
prosperous ones, and I don’t see how the aims of the Institute can be carried out
under their auspices. If the majority of the members of the Institute think it wise
to discontinue the organization of course there is nothing further to say, and I,
as a recently elected member, shall accept the decision as final. But if the matter
is still pending, as I understand it is, I should consider it my duty to vote
emphatically against the proposal. This, as you will have gathered, is what I am
doing by this long letter !"(
Now Armstrong had the opportunity to avoid these pitfalls and create a
unique role for the outcome of this shotgun marriage between the
intellectual and business worlds. He was an editor who had a vision of
what Foreign Affairs could be and rarely faltered in its pursuit. From the
beginning the emphasis was on the influential rather than simple mass
appeal : early speakers included Georges Cle!menceau, the French
President, E! douard Herriot, the French Premier, J. Ramsay MacDonald,
the British Prime Minister, his compatriot Lord Robert Cecil, and similar
luminaries. Most were given the opportunity to speak confidentially off
the record, though particularly prestigious addresses were sometimes
"( Armstrong to Shepardson, 6 Dec. 1920, Armstrong papers, box 57, file Whitney H.
Shepardson.
Hamilton Fish Armstrong 71
open to the general public. Likewise, the editors deliberately solicited
articles not only from political and academic commentators but from
leading statesmen, financiers, and economists : just a few examples of the
early contributors include V. I. Lenin, Hjalmar Schacht, Heinrich
Bru$ ning, Raymond Poincare! , Leon Trotsky, and Thomas W. Lamont, all
writing on issues then much in the news which they themselves were in
a position to affect. It quickly became a tradition that before each
presidential election representatives of the major political parties should
publish pieces on their party’s foreign policy achievements and outlook,
and that Secretaries of State should give at least one address before the
Council. ‘‘Our circulation is not large (only 15,000), ’’ Armstrong rather
smugly told President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1944, ‘‘but as you know,
it includes the most influential people all over the country, as well as many
key people in foreign governments. ’’") The Council sponsored study
groups which considered such topical issues as Anglo-American relations,
disarmament policy, Latin American affairs, Far Eastern affairs,
economics, and raw materials policy, groups which generally attracted at
least some participants from the Department of State. The organization’s
emphasis and activities in turn succeeded in winning it further
memberships and financial support from the influential internationalist
New York business community, always the Council’s economic mainstay,
and from the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation."*
Armstrong’s duties were not so onerous as to prevent him from
travelling extensively in Europe between the wars, and many of the most
interesting entries in his diaries relate to these itineraries. To give only one
example, in 1928 he visited Soviet Russia, where he had lengthy talks with
Maxim Litvinov, the Acting Commissar for Foreign Affairs, in which the
latter suggested that the Soviet Union expected little from either
American presidential candidate that year.#! As editor of Foreign Affairs,
Armstrong not only solicited articles from leading American and foreign
figures, he also had the entre! e into top American political circles. His
diaries for the early 1930s contain numerous entries relating to the
international financial crisis, the Manchurian crisis, and disarmament
negotiations, and he was in the confidence of leading American
") Armstrong to Roosevelt, 10 July 1944, ibid., box 53, file Franklin D. Roosevelt.
"* Schulzinger, 10–57 ; Wala, 15–29 ; Grose, 9–20.
#! Armstong, Peace and Counter-Peace, 413–14 ; this account is based on Armstrong’s notes
on this meeting, Armstrong papers, box 99, file Hamilton Fish Armstrong-Memoranda
1928.
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government officials and bankers.#" The selection and timing of Foreign
Affairs articles was on occasions deliberately designed to exercise the
maximum effect on public issues.
This should not be taken as implying that the journal served simply as
the American government’s mouthpiece. Rather, despite the Council’s
own disclaimers, as stated in Foreign Affairs, that it ‘‘[did] not represent
any consensus of beliefs, ’’ which was at least to some degree true of the
journal’s editorial policy, in practice the organization attracted and
represented primarily those elite Americans who had supported American
intervention in the First World War and strongly believed that the United
States should have been more involved in world affairs after 1920 than was
in fact the case. Such Americans were, for example, disturbed by the
literature of the 1930s which suggested that American intervention had
been mistaken, that the Allies bore as much responsibility for the war as
had the Central powers, and that the United States had been drawn into
the war either by the machinations of international bankers and arms
merchants or by the Allies ’ skilful propaganda.## Armstrong almost
obsessively attacked the writings of Harry Elmer Barnes, who wrote
extensively on these themes, and his youthful criticism of university
military training now far behind him, he had no doubt that American
intervention in the First World War had been fully justified.#$
Armstrong’s position brought him close to others of his generation
who held this viewpoint. His first such friend was the rising young
journalist Walter Lippmann, who shared his passion for foreign affairs. In
the early 1930s Lippmann co-edited several volumes of the Council’s
annual publication, The United States in World Affairs. The two men
discussed their views and writings with each other and Armstrong
frequently solicited Lippmann’s articles for his journal. Both were
alarmed by United States withdrawal from the London Economic
Conference of 1933 and disappointed by the failure of disarmament
negotiations, though in the mid-1930s Lippmann tended to acquiesce in
American withdrawal from European affairs, policies Armstrong de-
#" See ibid., box 99, files Hamilton Fish Armstrong-Memoranda and boxes 120–23, files
Travels for the relevant years.
## For further discussion of this literature, see Warren I. Cohen, The American
Revisionists : The Lessons of Intervention in World War I (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1967).
#$ E.g., R. W. Seton-Watson to Armstrong, 3 Dec. 1926, Armstrong to Seton-Watson,
27 Dec. 1926, 13, 25 July 1927. Armstrong papers, box 56, file R. W. Seton-Watson;
Armstrong to Simeon Strunsky, 15 Oct. 1926, ibid., box 60, file Simeon Strunsky;
Armstrong to George W. Wickersham, 15 Aug. 1927, ibid., box 65, file George W.
Wickersham.
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plored. After almost a decade the friendship came to a bitter and
permanent end in 1937, when the married Lippmann eloped with
Armstrong’s wife, Helen Byrne Armstrong, the charming, witty, high-
strung, and intellectual daughter of an upper-class (albeit Irish Catholic)
New York lawyer. The desertion by his wife of almost twenty years, to
whom he was devoted, and the double betrayal by the best friend he so
greatly admired, stunned Armstrong. From then onward Lippmann and
Armstrong had no contact with each other and Lippmann, though he
remained probably the most influential US commentator on international
affairs, resigned from the Council’s committees and henceforth remained
conspicuously absent from its activities and publications.#%
By this time, however, Armstrong had become almost equally close to
a former young Foreign Service Officer, Allen W. Dulles, whom
economic necessity had driven to practice law with the prominent New
York firm Sullivan & Cromwell, in which his brother John Foster was a
leading partner, but whose first love remained international affairs. Allen
quickly became a strong supporter of the Council, becoming a director in
1927 and serving on several of its study groups.#& From 1933 onwards the
two men, along with other leading lights of the Council such as Henry L.
Stimson, increasingly sounded the then highly unfashionable rallying cry
of the need to resist the rise of Hitler and Mussolini. Armstrong in
particular was much affected by an interview with Hitler a month after the
latter came to power, which convinced him that war was likely in
Europe.#’ Both men were alarmed by the deteriorating European
situation. They united in deploring in particular the American con-
gressional and popular response, from 1935 onwards, of passing
neutrality legislation specifically designed to prevent the United States
being drawn into another war through disputes over trade with
belligerents or the rights of Americans to travel on belligerent ships or in
war zones. The two men co-authored two books opposing the neutrality
legislation, publications which developed out of a Council study group
and were sponsored by the Council : the first, Can We Be Neutral? (1936),
suggested modifications to the legislation and active American involve-
ment in world affairs with the aim of maintaining peace ; the second,
#% See correspondence between Armstrong and Lippmann, ibid., box 41 ; Ronald Steel,
Walter Lippmann and the American Century (Boston: Little Brown, 1980), 327–63.
#& Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (Boston: Houghton Miﬄin, 1994),
122–23.
#’ Armstrong, memorandum, 27 Apr. 1933, Armstrong papers, box 121, file Travels-
Germany 1933–57 ; see also Armstrong, memoranda, 20, 21 Apr. 1933, ibid ;
Armstrong, Peace and Counter-Peace, 534–40.
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Can America Stay Neutral? (1939), suggested that American disengage-
ment from the coming European war was an unrealistic hope.#( Armstrong
also favoured amending the Neutrality Acts to allow the President to
determine whether or not to invoke any or all of their provisions when he
declared that a state of war existed, a move which would have given the
President great discretion as to the degree to which the United States
leaned to one side or the other in response to any foreign war.#)
Simultaneously Armstrong alone also produced several books on
contemporary European affairs and America’s relationship to these, works
which suggested that fascism and democracy could not coexist and that
the United States could not ultimately remain unaffected by developments
in Europe. They included Hitler’s Reich – The First Phase (1933), Europe
Between Wars? (1934), ‘‘We Or They ’’ (1937), When There Is No Peace (1939),
and Chronology of Failure (1940).#* He was encouraged in these views by his
friendships with various likeminded American and British figures, among
them Sir Robert Vansittart of the British Foreign Office and the historians
Sir Harold Temperley and Arnold Toynbee, who strongly opposed the
appeasement policies of the Baldwin and Chamberlain governments.$!
After the Munich settlement a disillusioned and disapproving Armstrong
cabled to Vansittart : ‘‘Americans favorable to international collaboration
feel all basis for that has been swept away as no international engagement
any longer has value. ’’$" After Duff Cooper, the British First Lord of the
Admiralty, resigned his office in protest over Munich, the Council on
Foreign Relations gave him a confidential forum in which to express his
predictably critical views of British policy during his subsequent 1939
American lecture tour.$# Another strongly anti-Hitler figure was the
#( Ibid., 123–27 ; Dulles and Armstrong, Can We Be Neutral ? (New York: Harper &
Brothers, 1936) ; Dulles and Armstrong, Can America Stay Neutral ? (New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1939).
#) Armstrong to E. Worth Higgins, 22 Sept. 1938, Armstrong papers, box 63, file U.
#* Hitler’s Reich – The First Phase (New York: Macmillan, 1933) ; Europe Between Wars?
(New York: Macmillan, 1934) ; ‘‘We Or They ’’ : Two Worlds in Conflict (New York:
Macmillan, 1937) ; When There Is No Peace (New York: Macmillan, 1939) ; and
Chronology of Failure : The Last Days of the French Republic (New York: Macmillan,
1940). When There Is No Peace, published a few months after Munich, made the
bestseller lists in the United States and quickly went through three printings.
$! See correspondence for this period in Armstrong papers, box 61, file Harold
Temperley ; ibid., box 62, file Arnold Toynbee ; ibid., box 63, file Sir Robert Vansittart.
$" Armstrong to Vansittart, 20 Sept. 1938, ibid., box 63, file Robert G. Vansittart. See
also the other correspondence between the two men in this folder.
$# See Council on Foreign Relations papers, Council on Foreign Relations, New York
(micro-film ed.), Speakers files.
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journalist Dorothy Thompson, whose writings Armstrong featured in
Foreign Affairs. In 1935, for example, Armstrong asked her for ‘‘a sober
and careful comparison of what Hitler promised and what he has
produced’’ to be carried in the journal’s June issue.$$ Shortly afterwards
he commissioned a series of articles from assorted authors ‘‘on education,
religion, law, labor, etc., as they have been affected by the spirit, program
and decrees of the present German regime, ’’ arguing that ‘‘if we are to
resist effectively the spread of Nazi doctrine to other countries, and
mitigate or limit the results of the application of those doctrines within
Germany itself, we must deal with the elements of the problem
individually and in a detailed way, so as to bring home to those who are
interested in some particular field of activity the destructive results of Nazi
practice in that specific field. ’’$% Yet another kindred spirit was diplomat
George S. Messersmith, an early opponent of Hitler and Nazism whose
views the Roosevelt administration largely ignored until the late 1930s.$&
In so far as he could, Armstrong endeavoured to persuade Franklin D.
Roosevelt to endorse his views and deter the growing power of the
European dictators. Throughout the 1920s the two men, fellow
Democrats, were associated as officers of the Woodrow Wilson
Foundation, organized to promote the ideals of the late president, and
Armstrong would indeed remain active on this body until at least the
1950s.$’ In 1932 Armstrong, a longtime supporter of a strong League of
Nations, was repelled by Roosevelt’s politically motivated decision to
repudiate the League, of which the latter man had previously been a
strong supporter, and preferred the candidacy of the more dependably
Wilsonian Newton D. Baker.$( The election over, however, he moved to
ingratiate himself with the new president, on whose policies he hoped to
exercise some influence. In June 1933, back from six weeks in Central
Europe, Armstrong offered to give Roosevelt the benefit of his
experiences ; although on this occasion the President declined his offer, a
year later he was more successful in making a presidential appointment
upon his return from several weeks in Germany, Austria, and the Balkans,
perhaps because he asked for Roosevelt’s guidance before he wrote
$$ Armstrong to Dorothy Thompson, 18 Mar. 1935, Armstrong papers, box 62, file
Dorothy Thompson. $% Ibid., Armstrong to Thompson, 8 Oct. 1935.
$& See Armstrong papers, box 44, George S. Messersmith files.
$’ For the details of Armstrong’s activities, see ibid., boxes 80–83, Woodrow Wilson
Foundation files, and box 66, file Woodrow Wilson Foundation.
$( Armstrong to Ralph Hayes, 30 June 1932, ibid., box 53, file Franklin D. Roosevelt.
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several articles and a short book.$) On this occasion, Armstrong told his
equally anti-German friend George Messersmith: ‘‘The point I par-
ticularly wanted to make to him is that we should not finance American
exports to Germany. I gave him all the reasons, financial, political and
moral, and you will be interested to know that he expressed himself in
agreement with my conclusions. ’’$* Despite Armstrong’s optimism,
Roosevelt does not appear to have taken any action at this time on his
suggestions. When the book appeared, Armstrong sent Roosevelt a copy,
for which he received a warm note of appreciation.%! Similar affable
though perhaps to Armstrong somewhat unsatisfactory contacts con-
tinued throughout the decade.%" In 1936, in response to Italy’s invasion of
Abyssinia, Armstrong tried again to persuade Roosevelt and the
Department of State to block the extension of private American credits to
Italy.%#
As the President slowly moved closer to Armstrong’s position,
relations between the two men warmed still further. Armstrong
congratulated Roosevelt on the quarantine speech of October 1937, when
the President suggested the use of economic sanctions against aggressor
nations.%$ In April 1938 he responded instantly when Roosevelt offered
him a position on the newly established President’s Advisory Committee
on Political Refugees, a transnational body charged with facilitating the
escape of refugees from war-torn Europe. Particularly after war broke out
in 1939, Armstrong personally made every effort to rescue as many such
persons as possible, spending several months in Europe using all his
numerous influential international contacts in this enterprise.%% He did not
hesitate to ask Roosevelt himself for special authority and visa clearances
for European intellectuals and others in danger of German internment
and execution. Armstrong’s energetic action in this crisis was only
heightened by the fact that many of those most in need of rescue were
personal friends whom he had come to know during his extensive travels
of the previous two decades.%&
$) Armstrong to Marvin H. McIntyre, 9 June 1933, McIntyre to Armstrong, 15 June
1933, Armstrong to Roosevelt, 8 May 1934, Armstrong to McIntyre, 16 May 1934,
Armstrong to Marguerite LeHand, 22 May 1934, ibid.
$* Armstrong to Messersmith, 24 May 1934, ibid., box 44, file George S. Messersmith.
%! Roosevelt to Armstrong, 11 Aug. 1934, ibid., box 53, file Franklin D. Roosevelt.
%" See correspondence in ibid., file Franklin D. Roosevelt.
%# Armstrong to LeHand, 6 Nov. 1936, ibid.
%$ Armstrong to Roosevelt, 6 Oct. 1937 ibid.
%% See ibid., boxes 77 and 78, President’s Advisory Committee files.
%& Armstrong to Roosevelt (telegram), 19 June 1940, ibid., box 53, file Franklin D.
Roosevelt.
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Armstrong advocated a far more strenuous American response to the
European situation than the simple rescue of displaced persons and those
politically at odds with the fascist regimes. By early 1939 he confessed
himself disappointed by what he saw as Roosevelt’s failure to make ‘‘the
very best possible use, strategically speaking, of the opportunities which
he had a few weeks ago to define and popularize the American policy
which to my mind would best serve ultimate American interests. ’’%’ By
November 1940, however, Armstrong was a dedicated Roosevelt
supporter, won over by the President’s increasing tilt towards the Allies.%(
Armstrong was one of those most determined to push the President in this
direction. He was a founding member of the Century Group, inter-
ventionists who often met at the Century Club and who eventually formed
the ultra-pro-Allied organization Fight for Freedom; the Century Group’s
most energetic organizer, Francis Pickens Miller, was also a Council
employee on temporary leave of absence. Whereas the more moderate
Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies argued that such
assistance was the best means of keeping the United States out of the war,
the Century Group hoped that their country would join Great Britain
outright in the war against Hitler. They publicly urged Roosevelt to
introduce conscription, build up American defences, and give all assistance
possible to Britain, even at the risk of war with Germany, arguing that
American national security and Britain’s fate could not be separated.
In particular, in autumn 1940 they spearheaded a public campaign
urging the President to conclude the ‘‘Destroyers-for-Bases ’’ deal with
Britain ; and in 1941 strongly urged that the United States Navy escort
convoys of merchantmen bound for Britain, even at the risk of war, and
also advocated that the United States should include Greenland in its
defensive perimeter, a policy the Roosevelt administration adopted.%)
Even before the United States entered the war, the Council on Foreign
Relations, in collaboration with the Department of State, had begun to
plan for the post-war world, one essential feature of which in their view
would be that the United States would play a much larger role than had
hitherto been the case. Here again Armstrong was instrumental in setting
%’ Armstrong to Foster Kennedy, 16 Feb. 1939, ibid.
%( Armstrong to Roosevelt, 11 Nov. 1940, 30 Dec. 1940 ; Armstrong to Kenneth Stewart,
30 Dec. 1940 ; Armstrong to Ethel Salter, 9 Jan. 1941, ibid.
%) See Armstrong papers, box 44, Francis P. Miller files ; The Fight For Freedom
Committee Papers, Mudd Manuscripts Library, Princeton University ; also Francis
Pickens Miller, Man From the Valley : Memoirs of a th-Century Virginian (Chapel Hill :
University of North Carolina Press, 1971), 89–104 ; Mark Lincoln Chadwin, The
Warhawks: American Interventionists Before Pearl Harbor (New York: Norton, 1970).
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up this programme, as he had so many of the Council’s most topical study
and discussion groups and publications. As early as October 1939, well
before the United States had entered the war, the Council obtained
funding from the Rockefeller Foundation to finance a programme of
study groups to plan for the postwar world, an undertaking which had
Roosevelt’s tacit approval. The clincher in persuading the initially
dubious Rockefeller Foundation to open its purse was apparently an
interview between the Foundation’s Dr. Joseph Willits and George
Messersmith of the State Department, who ‘‘said that as regards other
projects which have come to the Department’s attention, none seemed of
quite the same calibre, and he must say frankly that many of them were
such as to cause the Department considerable concern. ’’ The two men
agreed that, in view of the controversial public debates then in progress,
for the time being this grant should receive as little publicity as possible.%*
This funding was renewed annually until 1945, and it resulted in
the massive War–Peace Studies, an enterprise which the Department of
State formally took over in February 1941, shifting its venue to
Washington, but which even so remained very much a joint State
Department–Council enterprise. Armstrong was a member of the Peace
Aims and Armaments Groups; other groups provided potential guidelines
and solutions for Territorial and Economic and Financial questions and,
after 1942, on the matter of International Organization. Once a week
throughout the war Armstrong travelled to Washington to attend
meetings of the Committee on Postwar Problems, which gathered in the
office of Sumner Welles, the Under Secretary of State, who was far closer
to Roosevelt than his superior, Cordell Hull. Another Council official,
Philip E. Mosely, spent most of the war in Washington working on the
Department’s Territorial Studies programme, which grew out of the
War–Peace Studies. It is difficult to assess the precise practical effects of
this programme, which produced numerous evaluations, memoranda, and
position papers, and also served as a venue to introduce government
officials to academic and business experts. Yet the very fact that it was
undertaken was evidence that, even before the United States formally
entered the war, leading officials envisaged that their country would
assume a far more activist international role.&!
%* Armstrong, ‘‘Memorandum of telephone conversation with Mr. Messersmith,
October 11, 1939, ’’ Armstrong papers, box 44, file George Messersmith 1938–40 ;
Inderjeet Parmar, ‘‘The Issue of State Power : The Council on Foreign Relations as
a Case Study, ’’ Journal of American Studies, 29 (1995), 87.
&! There are many documents relating to these activities in the Armstrong papers. See
especially boxes 72–76, Council on Foreign Relations series, Peace Aims and
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Armstrong’s wartime role was not limited to participation in the
War–Peace Studies. In October 1944 he was seconded to London, with
the rank of Minister, to work under John G. Winant, the American
Ambassador to Great Britain, on the problems then facing the European
Advisory Commission, which was supposed to devise workable arrange-
ments for the occupation of Germany and other defeated European
enemies. Although this gave Armstrong interesting insight into the
growing tensions between the Soviet Union and its allies over Poland and
Eastern Europe, and numerous opportunities to discuss international
affairs with his British counterparts at Chatham House and other
influential figures, within a few weeks he became frustrated when he
found that he had little real function to perform in his new posting.&"
Returning to Washington in early January, he confessed to an associate in
the Council’s War–Peace Studies that he ‘‘could not maintain that an
attempt had been made to use me to advantage, ’’ feelings he conveyed to
the new Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., who promptly
offered him a part-time unsalaried position with the title ‘‘Special Adviser
to the Secretary. ’’&# In this capacity Armstrong – still a firm Wilsonian,
who never entirely lost his youthful faith in and loyalty to the League of
Nations – together with Stettinius and the Republicans Harold Stassen,
John Foster Dulles, and Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, served on the
bipartisan American delegation to the spring 1945 San Francisco
Conference which hammered out the final details of the United Nations
Organization .&$ Eager to return to his first love, the Council, in July he
declined a further invitation from Stettinius as the American member of
a Preparatory Committee which would meet in London to lay the ground
for the future government of Germany.&%
War–Peace Studies files, and boxes 78–80, State Department series ; see also Parmar,
86–93 ; Wala, Council on Foreign Relations, 30–46 ; Schulzinger, Wise Men, 81–112 ;
Grose, Continuing the Inquiry, 23–26.
&" On Armstrong’s activities while in England, see also his diary entries for this period,
Armstrong papers, box 128 ; Armstrong to Mary H. Stevens, 20 Oct., 2, 14 Nov., 4
Dec. 1944, ibid., box 59, file Mary H. Stevens ; Armstrong memoranda for this period,
ibid., Memoranda series, box 100.
&# Armstrong to Philip E. Mosely, 2 Jan. 1945, ibid., box 45, file Philip E. Mosely
1941–52.
&$ For details of his activities at the conference, see Armstrong’s detailed diary notes for
this period, in Armstrong papers, United Nations series, boxes 84–87, and Memoranda
series, box 100 ; Armstrong’s correspondence with Stettinius during the period of the
conference, ibid., box 59, file Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. ; also Armstrong to Stevens,
3 May 1945, ibid., file Mary H. Stevens.
&% Armstrong to Stettinius, 23 July 1945, ibid., box 59, file Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.
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Armstrong’s decision to devote himself full-time again to the Council
and Foreign Affairs perhaps put him in an even better position to influence
the future of Europe and the development of the Cold War. From 1945
onwards the Council set up numerous study and discussion groups to
come up with recommendations on United States policy on international
issues, groups whose members included such leading officials as the
banker Frank Altschul, George F. Kennan, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Allen
W. Dulles, Dean Acheson, and John J. McCloy. Among the topics
covered in the seven or eight years after the war were Aid to Europe,
American–Russian Relations, Europe’s Economic and Political Re-
construction, Economic Aspects of American Foreign Policy, and the
United Nations, while one prestigious group spent the three years 1944 to
1947 simply discussing ‘‘American Foreign Policy. ’’ These groups served
the purpose of helping to hammer out an elite consensus on foreign
policy, providing a confidential forum in which those ‘‘in-and-outers ’’
who shuttled between government service and the worlds of business,
banking and law, academics, and government officials could, in modern
parlance, ‘‘brainstorm, ’’ floating potential courses of action before an
informed and discreet audience. Their meetings helped to develop the
initiatives which would bear fruit in the Marshall Plan, the regeneration
of Germany, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, American
rearmament, and United States support for European economic union.&&
Besides attending and participating in many of these groups’ meetings,
Armstrong made his own modest effort to influence public opinion at this
time by publishing The Calculated Risk (1947), a book which not only
argued in favour of the newly announced Marshall Plan, but also called
for the modification of the United Nations charter to allow nations which
so desired to sign a separate protocol under which they bound themselves
to come to the aid of any nation attacked in contravention of any
international treaty. This provision was intended to circumvent the veto
power on any United Nations action which its Charter gave to all the five
permanent Security Council members, including the Soviet Union.&’ In
addition, Armstrong played some role – just how significant is difficult to
assess – in shaping the views of the influential Senator Arthur H.
Vandenberg, the ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee when the Second World War ended, and that body’s chairman
in the crucial period 1947 to 1949. Armstrong and Vandenberg were
&& See Armstrong’s memoranda for this period, Armstrong papers, boxes 100–02, files
Memoranda 1945–58 ; Schulzinger, 113–43 ; Wala, chapters 3–7 ; Grose, 30–40.
&’ Armstrong, The Calculated Risk (New York: Macmillan, 1947).
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colleagues in negotiating the United Nations Charter at San Francisco,
and Armstrong helped to persuade his erstwhile associate to support the
Marshall Plan, the creation of first the Western European Union and then
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and finally the commitment of
American military resources to NATO.&(
Armstrong initially seems to have hoped for the continuation of
Soviet–American wartime co-operation. In January 1946 he professed
himself shocked by a proposal from George Brett, the head of Macmillans,
that he edit ‘‘a symposium … attacking the concept of collaboration with
Soviet Russia, ’’ even though he admitted: ‘‘We all have reservations
about the possibility of collaboration, and I think we ought to re-assess
our position constantly. ’’&) Within eighteen months, however, in the July
1947 issue of Foreign Affairs, Armstrong published what was almost
certainly the most influential article ever to appear in the journal’s pages,
the piece by Kennan (identified only as Mr. ‘‘X, ’’ undoubtedly a
remarkably thin disguise to most of those already moving in American
decision-making circles) entitled ‘‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct. ’’ This
piece, drawing on memoranda and telegrams Kennan had already
circulated around the Department of State, publicly stated the strategic
doctrine of ‘‘containment ’’ which would become the guiding principle of
United-States foreign policy for the next four decades.&* In 1948 he
followed this with another piece on Russia by a State Department official,
published under the pseudonym ‘‘Historicus, ’’ a memorandum by George
A. Morgan of the Division of Eastern European Affairs on the topic
‘‘Stalin on Revolution, ’’ drawing attention to Stalin’s recent public re-
espousal of encouragement of international Communist revolution.’!
These were only two of the many articles by officials, American and
others, among them Henry L. Stimson, John J. McCloy, John Foster
Dulles, and Dean Acheson, which essentially prepared public opinion to
accept the evolving Cold War policies. Just as before World War II
Foreign Affairs ’ pages had been particularly readily available to those who
condemned American neutrality and urged the United States to take a
more interventionist line in checking dictatorships, so after the war those
who favoured an activist United States policy towards Europe could
count on a friendly reception from the journal’s editor.
&( See correspondence between Armstrong and Vandenberg, 1945–50, Armstrong
papers, box 63, file Arthur H. Vandenberg.
&) Armstrong to Harold Stassen, 25 Jan. 1946, box 59, file Harold E. Stassen.
&* See Armstrong}Kennan correspondence, ibid., box 38 file George F. Kennan; also
Byron Dexter to Armstrong, 15 Apr. 1947, ibid., box 59, folder Mary H. Stevens
1944–70. ’! See material in ibid., box 34, file Historicus.
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The immediate post-war years were probably the period of Armstrong’s
greatest direct influence upon United States foreign policy ; despite painful
back problems, the 1950s were perhaps his golden age. Buoyed by an
extremely happy remarriage to a younger woman of British and German
extraction, he unobtrusively assumed the mantle of elder statesman. The
Armstrongs travelled extensively on all continents, a habit he would
continue until his death, interviewing international notables as one of
themselves and with considerable aplomb extracting articles from
distinguished but often reluctant authors. Foreign Affairs also provided a
forum for rising young academic and government stars, the most
celebrated of whom was perhaps Henry Kissinger, who not only
contributed numerous articles to the journal, using it as a springboard to
launch his career, but also authored a bestselling Council study on nuclear
weapons.’" Armstrong was a frequent star speaker in courses run by the
National War College, the State Department, and other government
agencies. As always, he participated energetically in Council discussion
and study groups, attracted speakers, and also helped to orchestrate
fundraising initiatives to tap the resources of both its wealthy individual
and corporate supporters and the large foundations which had become so
central to the finances of think-tanks such as the Council on Foreign
Relations.’# In the late 1950s he also had a discernible impact on his
country’s foreign-aid programme. After a lengthy tour of the Middle
East, undertaken at the request of the Senate, in February 1957 he
submitted reports which recommended the ‘‘separati[on of] economic
from military aid appropriations ’’ and ‘‘two specific and I think original
suggestions, one … to set up a Foreign Education Aid Fund, the
other … to create mechanisms to provide credit facilities for small
businessmen and farmers. ’’’$ His report was well received by both
Congress and the State Department, and correspondence between
Armstrong and Fulbright suggests that it helped to strengthen the still
young and struggling Fulbright Program of international educational
exchanges of scholars and students.’%
’" See ibid., box 39, Henry A. Kissinger files ; Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and
Foreign Policy (New York: Harper, 1957) ; Walter Isaacson, Kissinger : A Biography (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 82–88 ; Robert D. Schulzinger, Henry Kissinger :
Doctor of Diplomacy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 12–13.
’# For details see Armstrong papers, Council on Foreign Relations series.
’$ Armstrong to Robert R. Bowie, 19 Feb. 1957, ibid., box 56, file Senate Report 2 ;
United States Senate, 85 Cong., 1st Sess., Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid
Program, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq ; Report on United States Foreign Assistance Program
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957).
’% Armstrong to Fulbright, 19 Feb. 1957, Fulbright to Armstrong, 20 Feb. 1957,
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Armstrong remained at the helm of Foreign Affairs until 1972, when in
valediction he published the journal’s fiftieth anniversary issue. His final
years with the Council were shadowed by his growing discomfort over
both the Vietnam War itself and the manner in which it devastated the
Council’s gentlemanly tradition of civility in disagreement, and also by a
pronounced distaste for the changes initiated by its Chairman, David
Rockefeller, Cyrus R. Vance, and its new President, Bayless Manning,
appointed the Council’s first full-time managing director in 1971. The
function of the Council was changing and its influence was being
challenged by other institutions and by the fact that a New York elite no
longer dominated the United States to the same degree ; in 1971 one of
its fellows wrote :
It is questionable … whether the CFR should consciously strive, as it may have
during the 1930s, 40s and 50s, to be a consensus-builder and transmitter of that
consensus to the governmental policy process. Distilling the issues and clarifying
policy alternatives for the United States should be its goal.’&
Armstrong undoubtedly agreed with the plaint of his old associate,
Walter Mallory, now retired: ‘‘The organization more and more assumes
the character of the [far less exclusive and influential] Foreign Policy
Association. ’’’’ The age of the common man and the new sixties ’
disrespect for convention and good form could not but repel the Council’s
conservatively mannered founding elders. They, in turn, were often
depicted as outdated and stuffy. In 1970 a group of younger academics and
journalists, most with some Harvard connection, founded Foreign Policy,
a rival journal whose editors suggested that Foreign Affairs was
‘‘unbelievably pompous, sleepy, and filled with articles ghost-written by
the heads of many states. ’’’(
Attempting to change this image, Manning initiated moves designed to
broaden its member base geographically and socially, for the first time
admitting women and consciously attempting to increase the numbers of
black and younger members.’) Armstrong was particularly distressed by
Armstrong papers, box 56, file Senate Report 2 ; see also other correspondence and
reports in this file and in ibid., files Senate Report 1 and Senate Report 3.
’& Robert Gerald Livingston to David MacEachron, 1 Nov. 1971, ibid., box 65, file
Council on Foreign Relations–Livingston Memorandum.
’’ Mallory to Armstrong, 2 Aug. 1972, ibid., box 42, file Walter H. Mallory.
’( Clipping, Harvard Crimson, Friday, 23 Apr. 1971, in ibid., box 76, file Foreign
Affairs–Harvard Crimson.
’) On these changes, see Grose, Continuing the Inquiry, 53–61 ; Schulzinger, Wise Men,
212–17.
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the increasingly strong possibility that women would be allowed to join ;
he believed that the arguments against this were ‘‘incontrovertible, ’’ that
their presence would ‘‘tend gradually to transform the Council into more
of a social organization, ’’ and that ‘‘the advantages to the Council of
taking them in are out of proportion to the difficulties and risks
involved. ’’’* Armstrong also took great exception to Manning’s plans to
celebrate his fifty years with the Council with a huge fund-raising dinner
at which William P. Rogers, the Secretary of State, would preside, a
scheme he considered vulgar in the extreme and an affront to the Council’s
ethos. He feared that the presence of Rogers, for whom he had no
intellectual respect, would lead Foreign Affairs to be regarded as a mere
adjunct to the government. He also objected to Manning’s intention to
open a Washington office of the Council, which he feared would cheapen
the Council and make it appear a lobbying organization.(!
In 1971 Armstrong, despite some apparent private misgivings of his
own, was also distressed by the reaction when the council announced
his old prote!ge! William P. Bundy, the former Assistant Secretary
State for Far Eastern Affairs under Kennedy and Johnson and Dean
Acheson’s son-in-law, would replace him in the near future, when he
left Foreign Affairs after completing his fifty years as editor. Armstrong
had known Bundy and his family for many years and loyally welcomed the
appointment, telling his successor in ‘‘one of the most rewarding jobs in
the world’’ that the choice gave him the ‘‘greatest possible satisfaction, ’’
and offering to help in any way possible but to refrain from any
interference.(" A substantial minority of Council members, led by the
Princeton academics Richard Falk and Richard Ullman, were less
enthusiastic, arguing that Bundy, whom they believed was greatly to
blame for American involvement in Vietnam, was an inappropriate
candidate who would be unable to exercise sufficient objectivity to be an
unbiased editor. They launched a well-publicized though unsuccessful
attempt to rescind the appointment, a move which greatly distressed
Armstrong, who believed that Bundy’s policies, though possibly
’* ‘‘Memorandum by Mr. Armstrong on the Draft Report of the Membership Review
Committee of July 19, 1969, ’’ 14 Aug. 1969, Armstrong papers, box 70, file Council
on Foreign Relations–Correspondence and Memoranda 1968–69.
(! Armstrong to Manning, 24 July 1972, Manning to Armstrong, 26 July 1972, ibid., box
43, file Bayless Manning. Armstrong sent a copy of this letter to all the Council’s
Directors. See also Frank Altschul to Armstrong, 28 July 1972, Armstrong to
Altschul, 1 Aug. 1972, ibid. ; Altschul to John J. McCloy, 5 Aug. 1972, Armstrong
papers, box 2, file Frank L. Altschul.
(" Armstrong to William P. Bundy, 4 Feb. 1971, ibid., box 13, file William P. Bundy.
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mistaken, had been undertaken in good faith and that ‘‘he and the others
who made Vietnam policy had done their duty as they saw it at the
time. ’’(# Armstrong was particularly disturbed by the contingent personal
attacks on Bundy, some of which bluntly stated that he was a criminal who
should stand trial for war atrocities, which to Armstrong were a total
negation of the principle of courteous if sometimes heated respect for
differing viewpoints which in his view had always characterized the
Council.($ Like other quondam critics of Bundy’s policies, George Ball
for example, Armstrong responded indirectly by sponsoring Bundy’s
membership in the exclusive Century Association, citing his ‘‘really
distinguished career in government ’’ and the fact that his nominee was
‘‘in every respect a cultivated and humane and likeable individual. ’’(%
The Vietnam War itself, however, was a subject on which Armstrong
came to have the gravest of reservations. As early as May 1965 he told a
high Council official that he had ‘‘lost a great deal of [his] respect for
[Secretary of State Dean] Rusk in the last months ’’ and that he believed
that President Johnson’s ‘‘handling of foreign affairs has been crude and
impulsive. ’’(& A few months later he suggested to Arthur H. Dean, a
leading New York lawyer and a long-time Director of the Council, that
to take out a large public advertisement in the New York Times supporting
administration policy on Vietnam might suggest ‘‘desperation’’ in the
White House, and, when Dean did so regardless, Armstrong refused to
sign it.(’ He gently reproved a Yugoslav academic friend who participated
in a mock trial, organized by Bertrand Russell, of Johnson and his Cabinet
officials for war crimes, on the grounds that this might actually hamper
those Americans who wished ‘‘to bring the Viet Nam war to an end, ’’
which Armstrong declared to be his ‘‘only concern. ’’(( In 1967 he refused
to sign another manifesto drafted by Paul Douglas, in this case one
(# Armstrong to Frank L. Altschul, 8 July 1971, ibid., box 2, file Frank L. Altschul ; see
also Altschul to Armstrong, 20 July 1971, Armstrong to Altschul, 2 August 1971,
ibid. ; William L. Langer to Armstrong, 21 Aug. 1971, Armstrong to Langer, 25 Aug.
1971, ibid., box 48, file Peace and Counterpeace. On the controversy, see Grose,
Continuing the Inquiry, 50–51 ; Schulzinger, Wise Men of Foreign Affairs, 210–11.
($ See minutes of 157th meeting of the Board of Directors of the Council on Foreign
Relations, 22 July 1971, and attached letter, Richard Falk to David Rockefeller, 19 July
1971, Armstrong papers, box 70, file Council on Foreign Relations–Balance Sheets.
(% Armstrong to Admissions Committee, Century Association, 29 Apr. 1971, ibid., box
13, file William P. Bundy.
(& Armstrong to Henry M. Wriston, 26 May 1965, ibid., box 66, file Henry M. Wriston.
(’ Armstrong to Arthur H. Dean, 9 Aug. 1965, ibid., box 63, file Vietnam; Armstrong
to Dean, 29 Aug. 1965, Armstrong to McGeorge Bundy, 9 Aug. 1965, Armstrong to
McCloy, 9 Aug. 1965, ibid., file Arthur H. Dean.
(( Armstrong to Vladimir Dedijer, 27 Sept. 1966, ibid., box 54, file Bertrand Russell.
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supporting all efforts to bring about peace, praising its ‘‘excellent
objectives ’’ but explaining that ‘‘over forty years as editor of a non-
partisan periodical, I ’ve refrained from adding my signature to any sort
of manifesto no matter how laudable. ’’() By 1967 Armstrong was alarmed
by the possibility that American and Vietnamese troops might expand the
war from South Vietnam into neighbouring Cambodia, and wrote to
McGeorge Bundy, the former National Security Adviser, expressing his
misgivings. He was particularly – and rightly – concerned that the
introduction of South Vietnamese troops into Cambodia, a hereditary
enemy, might lead the latter country’s ruler, Prince Norodom Sihanouk,
to seek aid from the People’s Republic of China, thereby enlarging the war
and probably bringing about ultimate Communist domination of
Cambodia. Armstrong urged that the United States should therefore
respect Cambodia’s neutrality.(*
For years the Council was riven by divisions over Vietnam, which
transformed its previous atmosphere of slightly rarefied disagreements
into one characterized by bitter personal attacks and discord. Between
1964 and 1968 the issue of Vietnam was so sensitive that no study group
even attempted to tackle it. It was the elderly Armstrong who
courageously broke the Council’s silence in spring 1968, just after the
crucial Tet offensive, by devoting large portions of three successive issues
of Foreign Affairs to the war. These included articles giving varying
perspectives on the conflict. In the first such issue Roger Hilsman,
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs under Kennedy and
Johnson, argued that the United States faced a choice between further
escalation of the war and gradual withdrawal ; he urged the latter course.
Sir Robert Thompson, a British specialist on guerrilla warfare, suggested
that the war could be won but this would be a long, slow process. Chester
L. Cooper, a former National Security Council Assistant for Asian Affairs,
suggested that a negotiated peace was a possibility, though achieving it
would be difficult.)!
Despite misgivings from the Council’s chairman, John J. McCloy, who
attempted to dissuade him by the argument that his views would be taken
as an official statement of the Council’s position, Armstrong also included
a contribution from himself which, as he told President Johnson’s liberal
() Armstrong to Paul H. Douglas, 19 Oct. 1967, ibid., box 24, file Paul H. Douglas.
(* Armstrong to Richard Helms, 29 Dec. 1967, ibid. ; Armstrong to Bundy, 25 Dec.
1967, ibid., box 13, file McGeorge Bundy.
)! Roger Hilsman, ‘‘Must We Invade the North? ’’, Foreign Affairs, 46 (1968), 425–41 ; Sir
Robert Thompson, ‘‘Squaring the Error, ’’ ibid., 442–53 ; Chester L. Cooper, ‘‘The
Complexities of Negotiation, ’’ ibid., 454–66.
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aide Bill Moyers : ‘‘I found I could not help writing. ’’ He even told
McCloy: ‘‘By and large, most of the articles we have printed in foreign
affairs over the years have tended to support Washington. … [I]t
doesn’t seem to me detrimental to foreign affairs to indicate once in a
while that we really are an independent organ of opinion. ’’)" He warned
that Americans ‘‘must reconcile ourselves to the fact that there is not a
final solution to the war there ’’ and that the United States would be unable
to attain anything it could define as victory. He urged negotiations with
the Viet Cong, expressed great unease with aspects of the Thieu regime,
and suggested that the United States must insist that South Vietnam’s
government institute genuine political and land reforms and force the
Thieu Government to broaden its base by including representatives of
other political parties. He hoped that part or all of Vietnam might
eventually be neutralized, the guarantors of such a settlement to be the
United States, other Asian governments, and perhaps even the Soviet
Union. He stated firmly:
[O]ur country cannot in conscience or good sense continue sacrificing lives – our
own, those of our friends and those of our enemies – in an enterprise which was
designed to help a people to freedom and prosperity but which instead is
destroying them. Circumstances have changed and our policies must change to
accord with them. We can assert with proper pride that our motives in first
intervening in Viet Nam were of the best, and without humiliation that, in spite
of greater efforts and painful sacrifices, our calculations – or lack of them –
somewhere along the way misled us.)#
In his remaining years as editor Armstrong continued to publish
extensively on Vietnam, as well as urging the Council to undertake a study
of the reasons of American intervention in the region.)$ Armstrong’s
choice of authors, whatever attempts he made to be impartial, undoubtedly
reflected a strong sense that American involvement in the war was
mistaken and must be brought to an end. The following issue carried
articles by the political scientists Herman Kahn and Samuel P. Huntington
on potential negotiated settlements, and by Bill Moyers, a former aide to
President Johnson, on the American tradition of political dissent as
)" Armstrong to Moyers, 1 Mar. 1968, Armstrong papers, box 45, file Bill Moyers ;
Armstrong to McCloy, 2 Feb. 1968, McCloy to Armstrong, 28 Feb. 1968, ibid., box
42, file John J. McCloy; Armstrong to McCloy, 29 Feb. 1968, ibid., box 63, file
Vietnam.
)# Armstrong, ‘‘Power in a Sieve, ’’ Foreign Affairs, 46 (1968), 467–75, quotation from
473.
)$ Armstrong to McCloy, 2 Feb. 1968, Armstrong papers, box 42, file John J. McCloy.
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demonstrated over Vietnam.)% Early in 1969 the incoming National
Security Adviser, Henry A. Kissinger, a former Council research fellow,
wrote on the ongoing Paris peace negotiations, while later in the year the
journal published an account by Clark Clifford, the outgoing Secretary of
Defense and a well-known dove, as to the evolution of his views on
Vietnam.)& William P. Bundy, trimming to the prevailing winds,
suggested that the balance of power in Asia was changing, due to China’s
Cultural Revolution and other factors, and that the rationale for American
involvement in Southeast Asia had been greatly modified if it had not
disappeared completely.)’ Early in 1971 Armstrong published a piece by
the well-known journalist Harrison Salisbury, who in 1966 was the first
American newspaperman to report from the North, which warned any
remaining optimistic Americans that, after fighting bitterly for several
decades against the French and the Americans, the North Vietnamese
were unlikely to accept any settlement which failed to tilt the military
balance in their favour.)( For the next issue Armstrong solicited an article
from Matthew Ridgway, commander of the United States troops during
the Korean War, in which the old general suggested that the United States
use whatever means necessary to extricate itself from Vietnam.))
Unlike some Establishment critics of Vietnam, such as George Ball and
Walter Lippmann, who regarded the war primarily as a strategic mistake
on the part of the United States, Armstrong, still at heart a Wilsonian, was
genuinely horrified by the savagery with which Americans waged the war,
behaviour which he regarded as a betrayal of his country’s ideals. In 1971
he sent to numerous members of Congress pictures taken by Life
photographer Larry Burrows which graphically portrayed the sufferings
of the ordinary people of Vietnam.)* After the Christmas 1972 air raids on
North Vietnam, Armstrong told Time : ‘‘[N]othing will justify the
bombing of the North. Millions of Americans are disgusted by it and feel
)% Herman Kahn, ‘‘If Negotiations Fail, ’’ Foreign Affairs, 46 (1968), 627–41 ; Samuel P.
Huntington, ‘‘The Bases of Accommodation, ’’ ibid., 642–56 ; Bill D. Moyers, ‘‘One
Thing We Learned, ’’ ibid., 657–64.
)& Kissinger, ‘‘The Viet Nam Negotiations, ’’ ibid., 47 (1969), 211–34 ; Clifford, ‘‘A Viet
Nam Reappraisal : The Personal History of One Man’s View and How It Evolved, ’’
ibid., 47 (1969), 601–22.
)’ William P. Bundy, ‘‘New Tides in Southeast Asia, ’’ ibid., 49 (1971), 187–200.
)( Harrison E. Salisbury, ‘‘Image and Reality in Indochina, ’’ ibid., 49 (1971), 381–94.
)) Matthew B. Ridgway, ‘‘Indochina : Disengaging, ’’ ibid., 49 (1971), 583–92 ; see also
Armstrong’s correspondence with Ridgway on this article in Armstrong papers, box
52, file Matthew B. Ridgway.
)* Details of this mailing are in ibid., box 63, file Vietnam.
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uneasy about not being given any rationale or explanation. ’’*! Yet,
somewhat ironically, the Council found itself the target of demonstrations
by protesters demanding that it condemn the war and United States
bombing in Indochina and use its influence to bring about withdrawal.*"
Armstrong’s swansong was his valedictory article ‘‘Isolated America, ’’
published in the fiftieth-anniversary issue of Foreign Affairs, the last he
edited before handing over to William P. Bundy. In it he looked back over
its half-century to declare : ‘‘Not since we withdrew into comfortable
isolation in 1920 has the prestige of the United States stood so low, ’’ he
stated. ‘‘The risk today is not that the American people may become
isolationist ; the reality is that the United States is being isolated. ’’ The
Vietnam War, he warned, ‘‘the longest and in some respects the most
calamitous war in our history, ’’ had ‘‘rent the American people apart,
spiritually and politically. It is a war which has not been and could not be
won, a war which was pushed from small beginnings to an appalling
multitude of horrors. … The methods we have used have scandalized and
disgusted public opinion in almost all foreign countries. ’’ Other foreign
policy initiatives – the imposition of an import surcharge, visits to
Moscow and Peking – were in themselves admirable, providing that ‘‘the
endeavor did not involve sacrificing friendships and alliances with people
with whom we had close ties. ’’ The proviso was not heeded and some
American allies, notably Canada, Japan, and India, felt badly treated. As
a result, ‘‘American principles, which sometimes were characterized as
naive but in general were respected as sincere and humane, now are freely
called hypocritical and self-serving. … The rhetoric of good works and
high ideals is everywhere heard … but the words used to express the
highest aspirations have become shopworn. ’’ Armstrong did not,
however, despair. He called upon the United States to regain its former
high standing in the world ‘‘by rehumanizing ourselves, by readopting
civility as part of good behavior, by recognizing that history can inform
the future, by encouraging the growth of elites in many fields, not in order
to copy them snobbishly but to set standards to which everyone may in
some degree aspire, by asserting that aesthetics is an essential element in
art, by reestablishing learning as opening doors to choice, by leavening
the mediocrity of our culture with snatches of unorthodoxy, by welcoming
diversity of opinion as an essential element of strength in a democracy.*#
*! Excerpt from Time, 8 Jan. 1973, 14, ibid.
*" See, e.g., flyer circulated by Columbia’s Social Scientists for Peace Now, late Apr.
1971, Armstrong papers, box 43, file Bayless Manning.
*# Armstrong, ‘‘Isolated America, ’’ Foreign Affairs, 51 (1972), 1–10.
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As his valedictory article suggests, throughout his career Armstrong’s
had been a relatively liberal voice. One of his most attractive traits was his
readiness throughout his lengthy time at the helm of Foreign Affairs to
reconsider his views. In 1966 he wrote to McGeorge Bundy:
Are there limits to our national needs for influence in the world, and what are
they? … . Personally, I ’ve always maintained that our interests are world-wide
but that we should be chary about assuming that we can secure those which lie
outside the scope of our material power. The protection and promotion of those
interests so far as possible, I thought, was the task of diplomacy.
We are now engaged on the mainland of Asia, we have troops and nuclear
weapons in Europe, we are assumed by Latin Americans to be responsible for
their prosperity or the reverse, and the list could be extended? Does this mean
there no longer are limits?
Perhaps there are not. Or perhaps enough thought has not been given to
whether or not the assumptions that led us into the Marshall Plan (with such
successful results) give us valid reason to assume that we can deal with new far-
flung problems with equal success.*$
Nonetheless, one can discern certain principles which informed his
entire career, and through it the policy of Foreign Affairs and the Council
on Foreign Relations. I have argued elsewhere that there exist two
traditions in twentieth-century United States foreign policy. One, which
can be traced back to Theodore Roosevelt, emphasizes that diplomacy
needs to be based upon military force, stresses the need for an Anglo-
American or Atlantic alliance, tends to rely upon great-power
negotiations, and calls for the maintenance of a balance of power
favourable to the United States. The other, which may be called
Wilsonian, after its founder, is far more universalist in outlook,
emphasizing the rights of all nations, large and small, and the need to base
policy upon moral, idealistic and righteous principles.*% To a considerable
degree, Armstrong’s outlook represented a fusion of these two strands.
Armstrong himself always remained faithful to the man who was his
youthful political idol. During the First World War he spoke disparagingly
of the views of those, such as Roosevelt and his associate General Leonard
Wood, who called for military preparedness and universal military
training, and was associated with the pacifist Oswald Garrison Villard.*&
Then and later admiration for Theodore Roosevelt was conspicuously
absent from his writings, while, as we have seen, he showed continuing
*$ Armstrong to Bundy, 3 Oct. 1996, Armstrong papers, box 13, file McGeorge Bundy.
*% Priscilla Roberts, ‘‘The Anglo-American Theme: American Visions of an Atlantic
Alliance, 1914–1933, ’’ Diplomatic History, 21 (1997), 333–64.
*& Armstrong, diary, 24, 29 Feb., 1,5,6 Mar., 4 Sept. 1916, Armstrong papers, box 128 ;
Villard to Armstrong, 17 Jan. 1935, ibid., box 63, file Oswald Garrison Villard.
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reverence for Wilson. In 1970 he told Marshall Tito of Yugoslavia that he
‘‘belonged to the school of Wilson and Masaryk, who believed in human
progress by politically moral methods. ’’*’ Congratulating Adlai Stevenson
on a speech, he told him: ‘‘Your revival of Wilsonian idealism warmed my
heart and carried me back to my first thrilling experiences with Wilson’s
extraordinary personality. ’’*( Discussing the League of Nations with
Henry R. Luce in the 1960s, he argued that ‘‘it was the absence of the
United States from the League [of Nations] that destroyed whatever
chance it might have had for usefulness and survival. ’’ He later told Luce
that ‘‘the Senate’s action [in rejecting the League] was part of the
isolationist attitude into which the U.S. gradually sank, and that, I feel
sure, can be put down among the probable contributing factors to World
War II. ’’ Armstrong also recalled that Franklin D. Roosevelt learnt from
Wilson’s failure the lesson that he might ‘‘prejudice the general peace settle-
ment … by tying them too closely to the plan for a world organization’’,
although Armstrong used his own position on the Committee on Postwar
Problems ‘‘to stimulate his interest ’’ in planning for a new League.*)
Armstrong’s own position might be described as a modified
Wilsonianism. He quickly abandoned the pacifism of his youth and
between the wars was one of the most vigorous American voices
supporting the strengthening of the League of Nations, preferably
reinforced by firm American backing. To Villard’s regret, in the 1930s he
clearly supported stronger American resistance to the growing power of
the dictators, if necessary through increased defence spending and the
introduction of conscription,** and in the early 1940s he was a strong
interventionist. In December 1941, as a member of the Armaments Group
of the War–Peace Studies, he showed considerable interest in bringing up
the question of whether the United States should secure air and naval
bases in the Pacific at the end of the war."!! All these positions suggest a
concern for national security and a readiness to use force when necessary,
as does his involvement in the Council’s assistance in developing the
*’ Armstrong, memorandum of conversation with Tito, 24 Sept. 1970, ibid., box 62, file
Josip Broz Tito.
*( Armstrong to Stevenson, 16 Nov. 1955, ibid., box 60, file Adlai E. Stevenson.
*) Armstrong to Henry R. Luce, 31 July, 1 Sept. 1964, ibid., box 53, file Franklin D.
Roosevelt ; on Roosevelt’s relationship to Wilson, see also Armstrong to Sumner
Welles, 15 Dec. 1948, 5 Apr. 1949, ibid., box 64, file Sumner Welles.
** Villard to Armstrong, 7 Jan. 1935, 15 Jan. 1937, Armstrong to Villard, 11 Jan. 1937,
9 Apr. 1938, ibid., box 63, file Oswald Garrison Villard.
"!! Armstrong, ‘‘Memorandum for Mr. Miller, ’’ 15 Dec. 1941, ibid., box 73, file War-
Peace Studies–Armaments Group-Memoranda and Meetings.
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policies under which the United States pledged itself to resist the spread
of Soviet influence in Europe immediately after the Second World War
and his desire to make it easier for the United Nations to take military
action in support of its declared policies.
Yet underlying these positions was a strong moralism. Indeed,
Armstrong’s early espousal of anti-Fascist American policies seems to
have been due not so much to considerations of the national interest and
the maintenance of a favourable European balance of power as to his
almost instinctive revulsion from Hitler and all his methods, which
affected him immediately he had met the Fu$ hrer and never changed. He
deprecated limited plans for an Anglo-American alliance, much preferring
a broader universalist approach, and in 1943 stated:
I am worried by the plans to reach the goal through regional Councils which
seem to me to offer too easy a way of escape for American isolationists who will
espouse the idea of an American Council and say that the British and Russians,
for example, must handle the problems of a council of Europe. I am also worried
by the talk about alliances, specifically an Anglo-American alliance, even though
the ultimate goal is a world organization. My reasons for this are principally two:
I don’t think we will get an Anglo-American alliance as a matter of practical
politics ; and I think it matters a good deal to other nations – e.g Russia, France,
Turkey, Brazil, Argentina, etc. – whether we try to implement a general
undertaking by specific understandings with Britain and other powerful nations
or whether we start with an alliance that leaves them out and then invite them
in."!"
Armstrong was always somewhat uncomfortable with undiluted
realpolitik. In 1957 he told a historian friend: ‘‘I think Churchill’s and
Stalin’s division of Eastern and Southern Europe into spheres of
influence, in percentages, not only showed Churchill extremely naive but
marked a moral lapse that has weakened our ability to stand up to
Communism in Eastern Europe … ever since. ’’"!# In 1952, writing to his
friend Hugh Seton-Watson, who had submitted an article suggesting that
it might be desirable that the fairly stable boundaries then attained in
Europe should last indefinitely, Armstrong confessed himself disturbed
since, ‘‘When you label any German demand for a change irredentism you
seem to me to accept the Soviet fait accompli. ’’ Although he said that his
opposition to this outlook sprang from fears that it would encourage
subsequent German revisionist demands for revenge upon Russia, equally
important seems to have been his concern that, ‘‘If the present regimes are
"!" Armstrong to Swing, 27 Sept. 1943, ibid., box 61, file Raymond Gram Swing.
"!# Armstrong to Raymond J. Sontag, 4 Sept. 1957, ibid., box 58, file Raymond J. Sontag.
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to be allowed to consolidate themselves within the present boundaries,
then what hope is there of bringing freedom to everyone some day? ’’"!$
The writings of the realist Hans J. Morgenthau were likewise profoundly
unsympathetic to him, and, despite the fact that Morgenthau was an
opponent of the American commitment in Vietnam – albeit for reasons
which differed from Armstrong’s – he was decidedly unhappy when
Morgenthau was awarded a Council fellowship in the mid-1960s. Indeed,
he saw what he believed was Morgenthau’s readiness to break the Council
seal of confidentiality in discussions as a prime example of the way in
which standards of behaviour had degenerated under the stress of
Vietnam."!% (One should note, however, that Armstrong was an early
admirer and publicist of the writings of both Kennan and Kissinger, both
of whom might also be regarded as adherents of the realist tradition, but
who perhaps tempered their views with a greater leavening of idealism
and moralism – or it may just have been that he found them personally
more congenial.) It is perhaps fair to say that Armstrong, although always
more a disciple of Wilson than of Roosevelt, represented a fusion of their
two approaches, such as could also be found in the policies of Franklin D.
Roosevelt."!&
One might go further and suggest that Armstrong’s own eclectic
foreign-policy outlook may have played its part in giving the Council the
resilience to weather the storms of fifty years and remain an influential
organization throughout that time. Armstrong was always less than
worshipful towards his Council’s wealthy business sponsors. In 1971,
shortly before his retirement, he complained that eight of thirteen
nominees for Resident Membership in the Council were bankers,
emphasizing: ‘‘The Council began as a merger of two organizations, on
the understanding and agreement that the business and non-business
elements would be pretty much held in balance, and this has been a feature
of the organization which has given it special values. ’’"!’ Many of its
"!$ Armstrong to Hugh Seton-Watson, 30 Dec. 1952, ibid., box 56, file Hugh Seton-
Watson.
"!% Wriston to Armstrong, 24 May 1965, Armstrong to Wriston, 26 May 1965, ibid., box
66, file Henry M. Wriston 1960–72 ; Armstrong to Frank Altschul, 30 Nov. 1966, ibid.,
box 45, file Hans J. Morgenthau.
"!& On the manner in which Franklin D. Roosevelt regarded himself as the heir to both
Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt, see John Lamberton Harper, American
Visions of Europe : Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and Dean G. Acheson
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 32–42.
"!’ Armstrong to Carroll L. Wilson, 16 Nov. 1971, Armstrong papers, box 70, file Council
on Foreign Relations–Correspondence ; cf. Armstrong to George Franklin and David
MacEachron, 5 Oct. 1965, ibid.
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earliest officers – Paul D. Cravath, Norman H. Davis, John W. Davis,
Thomas W. Lamont, Henry L. Stimson, and George W. Wickersham, for
example – were passionate Anglophiles who, despite the admiration of
some for Wilson, essentially adhered to the Rooseveltian viewpoint
described above."!( The Council might easily have become no more than
a mouthpiece for their views and, although these certainly received a good
airing, other potential versions of ‘internationalism’ also received fair
coverage from Wilson’s disciple, who would himself help to found the
United Nations. Perhaps more than any other one man Armstrong
prevented the Council’s monopolization by any one ‘‘internationalist ’’
school of thought, for fifty years deliberately – and sometimes over strong
protests from the organization’s more business-oriented members"!) –
providing an atmosphere hospitable to diverse and often conflicting
views, with many of which he was not necessarily in sympathy. This was
perhaps not entirely true of his role in the 1930s and 1940s, when he
clearly espoused a particular outlook and did what he could to publicize
and promote the view that the United States should intervene in
European affairs. In his final years, however, Armstrong’s continuing
open-mindedness gave him the courage to use Foreign Affairs to provide
a forum for dissenting views on the Vietnam War. While the Council,
whatever its claims to be impartial, undoubtedly represented the views of
a particular elite, most of them – including Armstrong – dedicated
believers that the United States should play a far greater international role
than it had hitherto done, it retained that flexibility and ability to co-opt
new men and new ideas and to adapt to changing circumstances which is
the hallmark of institutions possessing the ability to survive and to
weather difficult times. Deliberately or not, perhaps Armstrong’s greatest
contribution to the body which became his life’s work sprang from his
own humane, generous, and enlightened character, and would give the
‘‘Council [which ha]d been [his] creation’’ the strength to endure and
thrive even in adversity.
"!( For further details, see Roberts, ‘‘Anglo-American Vision’’ ; Parmar, ‘‘Issue of State
Power, ’’ 84–88 ; Schulzinger, Wise Men, 14–16.
"!) See, e.g., ibid., 17–19, 41 ; Grose, Continuing the Inquiry, 15. Schulzinger suggests that
Armstrong deliberately pursued a policy of giving a hearing in the Council to all points
of view, but restricting membership to those who were in general sympathy with its
prevailing ‘‘internationalist ’’ outlook.
